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Phishing is a type of Internet fraud that uses deceptive websites to trick
users into revealing sensitive information. Despite the availability of numerous
tools designed to detect phishing, it remains a steadily growing threat. The failure
of current anti-phishing solutions is largely due to their focus on detecting phishing
rather than addressing phishing's root cause: insecure web authentication.
Using a combination of the zero-knowledge mechanism and two-factor
authentication I present ZeKo, an authentication mechanism that is immune from
phishing attacks, cryptanalysis and man-in-the-middle attacks. ZeKo takes into
account the psychological behavior of users and remains secure even when the user
is deceived. The proposed system not only prevents phishing attacks but also has
considerable benefits over traditional authentication mechanisms, making it well
suited for a wide range of applications.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Phishing Epidemic
Phishing is a form of electronic identity theft in which phishers use
deceptive websites to trick users into disclosing sensitive information. Phishers lure
potential victims, often via e-mail, to websites designed to mimic the appearance
of legitimate sites where the victims would have an existing account or are looking
to do business. Under the impression that the website is legitimate, the victim fills
out the forms on the site with personal information and transmits it back to the
phisher. Phishing websites usually seek to obtain credit card information or
website usernames and passwords that can be used to purchase goods or transfer
funds.
Phishing activity has steadily increased to match the growth of web
commerce, recently taking on epidemic proportions. Symantec's reporting system
research saw 1,088 unique phishing e-mailsperdayforthefirsthalfof2007.an
18% increase over the last six months of 2006 [2]. The Anti-Phishing Working
Group confirmed 31,709 unique phishing sites in June 2007 alone [3]. In 2006, the
response rate to phishing e-mails were estimated to be as high as 19%, with up to
5% of all recipients revealing sensitive information [4]. Of those that revealed
information to phishers, 45% reported their information was used to perform
2unauthorized purchases or transfers [5]. Another study in 2007 on password habits
estimated that at least 0.4% of all users studied had revealed usernames and
passwords to phishers [6].
The financial services industry has borne the brunt of the phishing
epidemic; the cost of phishing activity to US banks and credit card institutions
estimated at $1.2 billion in 2003 [7], $1.7 billion in 2006 [8] and $3.2 billion in
2007 [9]. For the first half of 2007, phishing attacks targeting the login ID's for
financial service websites accounted for 79% of all reported phishing attacks [2].
Locally, phishing attacks have targeted the Lane county based Oregon Community
Credit Union [10] and even the University of Oregon's Duckweb system [ll].
Although the impact of phishing has been substantial, it is just one part of
the growing problem of identity theft in a digital age. The rise of web commerce
and web-accessible services has expanded the amount of personal information held
by agencies and on-line businesses, making unintended disclosure more probable.
In 2006, 15 million Americans became victims of identity theft; the average cost to
the victim was $1,244, with only 54% of the stolen funds ever being recovered [12].
To compound the problem of identity theft via phishing, many phishers also sell or
give away the stolen information on the Internet's Internet Relay Chat (IRC) black
markets, leading to account abuse by multiple identity thieves [13].
One of the most disturbing trends in recent phishing activity is its use as a
source of income for criminal organizations. Well-organized and well-financed
phishing operations have been linked to both organized crime and
terrorism [14, 15].
3The ZeKo Solution
Using a combination of the zero-knowledge mechanism and two-factor
authentication I present ZeKo, an authentication mechanism that is immune from
phishing attacks, cryptanalysis and man-in-the-middle attacks. Zero-knowledge
systems provide leak-proof communications between parties and cryptographic
security while two-factor systems prevent the inadvertent disclosure of
authentication elements by the user, the unique combination of these
authentication mechanisms allows ZeKo to compensate for the psychological
behavior of users and remains secure even when the user is deceived. The proposed
system not only prevents phishing attacks but also has considerable benefits over
traditional authentication mechanisms, making it well suited for a wide range of
applications.
Evaluations of ZeKo were conducted against SRP (a zero-knowledge
authentication system), WikID (a two-factor authentication system), and
username/password over a secure connection (the most common method of
authentication over the Web). The results show the ZeKo outperforms most
systems in memory usage, data storage costs, and transmission costs. In addition,
ZeKo provided more security benefits against phishing and active attack then any
of the examined protocols.
In this work I will first review the current state of anti-phishing systems
and their flaws in Chapter II. I will then present the design and function of my
own anti-phising authentication system, ZeKo, in Chapter III along with its
related work. The performance of ZeKo is evaluated against other authentication
systems with similar properties in Chapter IV and I conclude with a review of the
extended areas of research in Chapter V.
4Background on Phishing
User deception, while one of the least sophisticated forms of attack, is also
one of the most successful. Compared to the complexity of circumventing the
defenses of a securely designed system through technological means, deceiving the
user is often the quickest and most reliable methods of gaining access. The
technique of compromising security by manipulating users is often called social
engineering and is a classic tool used by computer hackers.
Phishing is a type social engineering attack that exploits the user's
ignorance about how websites and security technology works. Increasing numbers
of people integrate technology and the Internet into their lives with very little
understanding about how the underlying systems work or what security threats
they are vulnerable to. Users often determine the legitimacy of a website based on
the website content alone [16] and carryover decision strategies from real-world
interactions that are inappropriate for digital interactions[17] . Phishing uses
people's natural inclination to use the appearance of a website as a primary
indication of validity rather then the technical indicators such as SSL certificates.
Phishing's predecessors, false-login trojans, exploited the assumption of
legitimacy by the user before there was even an Internet to phish. False-login
trojans harvested passwords using programs that created input prompts that
appeared very similar to the legitimate login prompts, or by replacing the system
code for the legitimate login with their own versions. In addition to collecting
passwords for later retrieval by the attacker, the trojans also commonly installed
back-door access for the attacker through the use of a "super" password that was
always accepted [18]. The introduction of keystroke sequence Ctrl-Alt-Del to the
Windows login procedure was in direct response to the threat posed by login
5trojans (Ctrl-Alt-Del being a "Secure Attention Sequence" accessible only to the
operating system) [19]. False-login trojans continue to operate today and have
expanded to infect virtual machines [20].
On systems not connected to a network, the collection of login credentials
had only limited value; physical access was still required to retrieve the password
records and gain access to the system. The construction of a fake login also took
considerable technical knowhow, involving knowledge of the inner-workings of
compilers and the targeted operating system. These restrictions on the usefulness
of fake logins hampered their growth. Unlike the level of skill required to construct
false-login trojans, phishing can be performed with only a rudimentary
understanding of HTML. In fact, construction of phishing websites is often
handled by phishing kits [2] and requires very little technological expertise.
Phishing on attacks are commonly initiated using e-mail. The phisher
builds a website that mirrors the look of a legitimate website the users wish to
gain access to. The phisher then sends out e-mails with forged "from" addresses
that make the e-mail appear to be from the legitimate website. The phishing
e-mail is made to look official (through the use of logos and "business" language)
and compels the victim to follow a hyperlink embedded in the message. A
common phishing e-mail is one which tells the victim that the website has lost
their information and needs them to re-enter it; the messages also commonly
suggest that their account will be terminated if the information is not re-entered.
Sometimes phishing attacks are even self-referential, requesting information on the
pretense being part of the website's anti-phishing system.
The link in the e-mail that leads the user to the phishing site is often
misleading, with the displayed text of the hyperlink giving the Uniform Resource
Locator (URL) of the legitimate site while the link itself takes the user to the
6phishers site. The URLs of phishing sites are also commonly worded to appear
related to the targeted website, such as http://PayPal.phisher.com/ and
http://www.pay-pal-IDs.com/which both appear to be related to PayPal to those
not familiar with fully qualified domain name (FQDN) system. Other phishing
links simply use IP addresses (e.g., http://64.32.34.23/index.html) to avoid DNS
registration at all.
A more subtle form of phishing is called pharming, it involves implanting
fraudulent Domain Name System (DNS) records to provide users with IP
addresses to phishing websites when they request the IP addresses of legitimate
sites. Pharming is usually accomplished by poisoning the cache on a compromised
DNS server, or by re-configuring a victim's DNS server list to point to a DNS
server set up by the pharmer. Re-configuring the victim's DNS list can be done
using viruses, trojan horses or by compromising the network's DRCP server (like
in drive-by pharming, which exploits unconfigured wireless routers [21]).
Recently, there has also been a rise in vishing, where the personal
information is collected over the phone and not through a fraudulent website.
Similar to standard phishing, vishing uses mass e-mails to compel victims to call a
phone number and give their account information to an operator which is in fact
an identity thief. The rise in vishing may be related to the expansion of IP
telephony, providing voice lines which can be set up and run with minimal
exposure for the visher. Given the press attention surrounding phising in the last
few years, users may be more comfortable disclosing account information over the
phone and find the use of a phone more legitimate.
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CURRENT ANTI-PHISHING APPROACHES
Current Systems
The current anti-phishing systems that have seen significant deployments
on the Internet can be classified into three groups: (i) password management tools,
(ii) heuristic-based phishing detection mechanisms, and (iii) website credential
systems. Most anti-phishing systems usually incorporate strategies from several of
these groups to counterbalance each group's relative weaknesses. The most
popular tools use a combination of phishing detection and website credentials to
alert the user to potential phishing threats during web browsing. Increasingly
these tools have become an integral part of the web browser [22, 23].
While current schemes provide a level of protection against phishing sites,
they do not address the fundamental flaws in Internet authentication or provide
any protection in the event of a successful phishing attack.
Password Management
One of the simplest mechanisms for preventing phishing involves
automating the password entry mechanism through the use of password
managers [24, 25]. Users expose their passwords by submitting them to websites
that appear legitimate. Password managers prevent accidental exposures by
8utilizing technical identification procedures that are not influenced by human
perception. Password managers take the user out of the password submission
process and so limit the possibility of submission to an unauthorized server.
Managers have the added advantage of keeping track of a wide range of web
passwords, reducing forgotten password events and helping enforce strong, unique
passwords.
For example, most phishing sites can be easily distinguished from the
legitimate sites they mimic by examination of the URL; but most web users are
unfamiliar with URL structure and so rarely notice the discrepancies [26].
Password managers provide control on the release of passwords by managing their
password records based on the FQDNs of the servers the password was bound to.
While phishing URLs can be constructed to appear to related to the mimicked
site, the mechanical matchup between the FQDN associated with a password in a
password management system is immune to these deceptions.
Obfuscation is another technique used by password managers to prevent
unintended password release, commonly through the use of cryptographic
hashes [27, 28]. Password obfuscators use the combined hash of a user-selected
password and a piece of data unique to the legitimate site, often the DNS domain
name, as the password to the site. When the user authenticates, the obfuscators
recreate the hash based on the user's password and the data from the site being
submitted to. In the event this site being is a phishing site the password
submitted will not be the password to the legitimate site because the seed from
the website used in creating the password is different from the legitimate site,
producing a different result.
Despite the advantages of password managers, the problems that come
along with them outweigh the benefits. Even under perfect conditions most
9password managers are susceptible to pharming attacks, due to their assumptions
about the validity of DNS entries. Portability becomes a problem as users come to
rely on the managers to remember their passwords; portability is even more of a
problem with obfuscators where the password is unknown to the user and the
software is required to generate the website's password. Ultimately, password
managers are a stop-gap measure against the flaws inherent in the
username/password authentication mechanism itself.
Heuristic-based Phishing Detection
Heuristic-based phishing detection schemes attempt to identify phishing by
looking for phishing characteristics in a website's HTML or in the text of e-mail
messages. Most heuristics are simplistic and check for common phishing tactics
such as misleading URLs or hyperlinks to IP addresses. Systems such as
Spoofguard [29] and numerous browser plug-ins [30, 22, 23, 31] use
machine-readable properties of a website and compare them with the websites in
the browsers history to determine whether a site is legitimate (previously visited
sites assumed to be more legitimate). Similar heuristic-based schemes are used
identify phishing e-mails that lead users to fraudulent sites through deceptive
hyperlinks [32, 33]. Contextual analysis [34] and comparisons of the structure of
rendered webpages to pre-established signatures [35, 36] are some other, more
advanced, detection techniques proposed.
A recent survey tested the top 11 heuristic-based phishing detection
toolbars and found that the best performing system, Spoofguard [29], could detect
up to 95% of phishing websites, but with a false positive rate of 42%. No other
toolbar was able to detect more than 87% of the phishing websites analyzed [37].
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An evaluation of advanced machine-learning detection techniques have shown
similar results [38]. Another study tested users' responses to warnings from the
toolbars - despite correct identification of the phishing site by the toolbars, a
third of the participants still revealed usernames and passwords to fraudulent
sites [26].
Even at its best, heuristic-based phishing detection can only stop a limited
amount of phishing and is almost entirely helpless against pharming do to the
heuristic's assumption of DNS integrity. The heuristics used to detect phishing
behavior also require constant revision as phishing techniques change. For every
phishing trick that a heuristic learns to detect, there is soon another one that
avoids detection. The incomplete protection of phishing detection makes it
primarily a defensive mechanism and can not be expected to make a significant
impact against future phishing attacks.
Website Identification
Because phishing is fundamentally the result of misidentifying websites,
many anti-phishing systems are build around establishing positive website
identification before the user enters their authentication credentials. These
solutions either use technological means (such as certificates) which positively
identifies the site, or they present the site to the user in a manner which cannot be
duplicated.
Cueing
One of the most popular identification mechanisms adopted by websites to
prevent phishing is the use cues to signal their legitimacy to the user. The largest
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implementations are those using visual cues. In simple visual cuing [39, 40, 41],
the user has some unique image that the legitimate website would display but a
phishing site would not be able to. More sophisticated systems make cues integral
to the usage of websites, like through the use of visual keypads for password entry
that have a random arrangement of characters [42]. Other systems use complete
page transformations at the browser level to signal a page's legitimacy [43].
Despite the popularity of cue systems, studies have shown that cue systems
are ineffective at stopping phishing attacks [16, 26, 17, 44]. While some cues may
be ignored by users due to poor design, most are dismissed simply due to the
user's lack of understanding about website security. One study found that 97% of
users of a website with a prominent visual cue system would continue to enter
their passwords despite the cue being completely absent [44].
Verified Credentials
A more technical approach to website identification is based on website
credentials that automatically discriminating between legitimate sites and phishing
sites, usually through the use of a trusted third party. This approach aims to
enable legitimate websites to prove their own identities in a way phishing sites
could not mimic, thereby detecting phishing sites by their absence of credentials.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the most widespread example of a credential
system to identify legitimate websites. When a user establishes a secure
connection with a website, typically through the Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
protocol, the user can verify the public key certificate of the website in order to
make sure the website is legitimate.
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In a perfect world, credentials would effectively eliminate phishing. Most
users, however, do not understand how a website is verified using certificates or
understand the connection between encrypted communications and website
security. One study found that while 80% of users associated the image of a
padlock on a website with security, only 40% knew about the SSL indicator built
into the web browser (also a padlock) that signaled a secure connection with a
valid certificate [17]. Another study found that only 23% of users used the web
browser's SSL indicator as a factor in deciding whether or not a website was
legitimate, and only 9% of users had ever examined certificates [16].
Restriction Lists
The most common method of website identification utilized by most
popular anti-phishing toolbars is the use of whitelists and blacklists
[45, 30, 46, 22, 47, 23, 31]. Blacklists are usually populated through reports of
phishing activity. The lag before a phishing site is detected and added to a
blacklist limits the usefulness of blacklists against rapidly emerging threats.
Studies have shown that blacklists from Google and Microsoft only list 55-65% of
the active phishing sites reported in another well-known blacklist [48].
Whitelists have all the same problems as blacklists in terms of
incompleteness, as well as some of their own. For a whitelist to determine if a site
is legitimate, it first has to determine "who" the website claims to be. The
problem of determining "who" a website is claiming to be is just as hard a
problem as determining if a given site is legitimate in the first place. Both
blacklists and whitelists also usually assume the validity of DNS information,
making both of them vulnerable to pharming.
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Flaws in Current Approach
All of the currently proposed systems seek to combat phishing by stopping
the user from entering phishing information into a fraudulent website. Given a
perfect scenario where all phishing sites could be detected and users always
followed the tool's advice, this approach would be sufficient. In reality, many users
will make bad decisions and detection can always be assumed to be less then
perfect. Combatting phishing through detection and prevention is undermined by
the psychology of the user. For a solution to be effective it must not only provide
security when the user follows good security behavior, but also when they do not.
All the current anti-phishing tools suffer from two major design flaws: (1)
the reliance on user vigilance, and (2) the focus on detection rather than
prevention.
The Reliance on User Vigilance
The steady increase of phishing attacks over time despite the introduction
of anti-phishing technology strongly suggests that current solutions for combating
phishing are incapable of dealing with the problem. Rather than building strong
account security into the authentication process, websites often rely on the user's
vigilance in protecting their login information. This approach only works if users
are sophisticated and able to effectively detect phishing sites-an assumption
which has been repeatedly shown to be incorrect [16, 26, 17, 44, 49]. Security
indicators built into browsers that can indicate phishing are usually
ignored [44, 16], as are the security toolbars designed to detect phishing activity
and alert users [26].
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The most common response to the problem is user education, but even
using the most effective teaching methods available average users are still fooled by
30% of the phishing attacks [50]. A joint US and Canadian governmental working
group on mass marketing fraud [51] stated in very direct terms the problem with
relying on user education to solve the problem:
"Although consumer education programs are an important component
of the fight against phishing ... they will not suffice to provide
adequate protection for the public as phishers continue to refine their
attack techniques."
Any realistic solution for preventing phishing must not depend on
assumptions about user behavior; instead, the solution should compensate for user
behavior that is susceptible to phishing.
Detection without Prevention
The other fundamental deficiency of current anti-phishing solutions is the
focus on detection rather then prevention. Anti-phishing solutions which are
--- -- ------
designed to simply detect phishing attacks will always have a level of accuracy
below 100%. Making them not a solution, but simply a damage control measure.
Risk mitigation schemes are at best sandbag solutions and do nothing to address
root causes of the security problem. Even when phishing detection systems can
have detection rates as high as 91% [37], there are still phishing attacks which slip
by. The failure rate for an anti-phishing system, no matter how small, has very
serious economic and human consequences.
Due to their false positive rates, most of the phishing detection schemes do
not restrict insecure behavior and still rely on the user to make sound decisions on
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website security. Even in studies where anti-phishing tools had an 100% detection
rate, users distrusted the tool's conclusions and still entered sensitive information,
reducing the effective protection rate to between 50-77% [26].
Phishing detection schemes also commonly assume the integrity of the DNS
information, making them susceptible to pharming [37].
A complete solution to the phishing problem will not try to simply reduce
the threat of phishing, but will instead seek to eliminate it through solidly
designed authentication.
An Effective Anti-Phishing Strategy
My research moves in a fundamentally different direction from current
anti-phishing work by acknowledging the following essential facts:
• Users will disclose their login credentials to unauthorized third parties. Users
determine whether or not a website is trustworthy based on psychological
factors, factors that can be manipulated into giving the appearance of
legitimacy to fraudulent sites [52]. The average user will ignore tell-tale signs
of phishing attacks and even the toolbars designed to warn them of phishing
sites [26].
• Phishing sites fool even sophisticated users [16, 49] Increasing user awareness
about the threat posed by phishing does not necessarily lead to better
security practices by the user [17, 44]. Phishing, as it exists today, will
continue to occur in the future until the attack no longer provides the
phisher with access to the user's account.
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• The responsibility for the security of a system rests with the system designer)
not the user. Designers cannot rely on the user's compliance to a set of best
practices in order to protect the integrity of the user's account. Security for
the user should be inherent in the system, rather than a result of the user's
familiarity with security protocols. Systems which follow solid security
design principles must take into account the psychological component that
influences user behavior [53] and compensate for its flaws. Phishing is
primarily the result of a flaw in the authentication mechanism that allows
users to be psychologically manipulated.
• The network is adversarial. The username/password paradigm is an
authentication scheme held over from the days when system access was done
through physical terminals. It was assumed that physical terminals would
always be legitimate and all that was needed was a simple mechanism based
on a shared secret. With authentication over the Internet, the problem of
untrustworthy logins becomes acute. Secure design demands that an open
network like the Internet has to be considered to be adversarial, where
attackers can be in control of the links and nodes through which the
authentication traffic may pass. The authentication process should make no
assumptions about the legitimacy of any party involved.
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These realities are at the heart of my design philosophy, and drive my
approach to the phishing problem. Rather than just trying to reduce the damage
caused by phishing, I seek to remove the flaws from authentication design which
allows phishing to be successful. I aim to provide an effective solution for all
known phishing and third party attacks while fulfilling the technical specifications
set out by the Internet Engineering Task Force for phishing-resistant web
authentication [54].
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CHAPTER III
ZEKO AUTHENTICATION
Design Overview
The goal of the proposed system presented in this paper is to provide a
realistic and complete solution to the problem of password phishing on the
Internet. The system compensates for insecure user behavior and anticipates the
eventuality of of data disclosure. In order to achieve this end, the system is
resistant to both standard technical attacks on the authentication process as well
as attacks via psychological deception.
The proposed system, which is called ZeKo (in reference to Zero-Knowledge
authentication), seeks to take the burden of security off the individual users
through secure design. ZeKo prevents phishing through a process that reveals no
sensitive information during authentication and which uses credentials that cannot
be stolen by phishers. The system also makes no assumptions about the integrity
and secrecy of the authentication data on the server, or any data transmitted over
the network. The distrust and assumption of hostility by all elements on the
network allows the mechanism to function securely in an openly adversarial
environment.
In order to meet the goal of providing secure, phising-resistant
authentication the system must meet the following requirments:
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• Authentication that is resilient against the theft of authentication data,
including a username and password disclosed through phishing.
• Authentication that is immune to man-in-the-middle attacks.
• Authentication that is resistant to cryptanalysis on intercepted
communications or stolen authentication data.
ZeKo meets these requirements by using a unique mix of zero-knowledge
and two-factor authentication.
ZeTa Knowledge Authentication
Zero-Knowledge authentication is a practical application of the concept of a
zeTa-knowledge proof In a zero-knowledge proof, one party can confirm whether or
not a statement is true without revealing any other property about the
statement [55]. This type of proof is especially useful in the context of remote
authentication because of the risk of disclosure through the insecure transmission
medium. If two parties agree to certain constraints beforehand, each party can use
the truth of the other's statement as a form of positive identification without
transmitting anything that can be used by a malicious party to impersonate either
of the parties.
While zero-knowledge proofs can be constructed out of a wide range of
problems (most notably all problems in NP [56]), most of them are not practical
for realistic authentication systems. Real-world zero-knowledge systems generally
leverage the difficulty in solving the equation v = gX mod n for x (with sufficiently
large integer values for g, n, and v). Zero-knowledge has found numerous
applications in cryptography, being the basis for the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange [57] and asymmetric cryptography (such as RSA [58]).
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Along with cryptography, authentication is a natural application for
zero-knowledge proofs, as the proof of statements can be used to confirm the
identities of the participating parties. It is especially appealing in an environment
such as the Internet where any disclosed information could be used by an attacker.
In a zero-knowledge authentication system the server, the client, nor any attacker
could use the data exchanged or the data they hold to mimic any other party
involved. Zero-knowledge systems are inherently resistant to attacks involving
fraudulent servers, clients, and man-in-the-middle attackers because all systems
are treated with the same level of distrust.
Zero-knowledge authentication stemmed from early work in zero-knowledge
key exchange, such as the Lomas-Gong-Saltzer-Needham system [59] (LGSN). The
first major implementation of a zero-knowledge authentication system was EKE,
short for Encrypted key exchange [60]. EKE uses a shared secret between t4e
client and server to negotiate a shared key to be used for encrypted
communications. The principles behind EKE became the basis for several
variations of EKE [61, 62], including a version that negotiated a key on the basis
of a memorable password [63]. Other refinements to EKE have dealt with flaws in
the mechanics of the protocol [64, 65]. Figure 1 [1] gives a rough genealogy of
EKE and its relation to other zero-knowledge systems.
Following EKE were a new crop of zero-knowledge authentication systems,
most notably SRP (Secure Remote Password protocol) [66, 67]. SRP improves on
the performance of EKE and adds additional protections from the leak of
cryptographic data. While still operating on a simple, memorable password, SRP
provided mutual authentication without the use of a third party.
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Fig. 1: An overview of EKE and its derivatives [1]
Despite the advancement of zero-knowledge systems, the unique
requirements for web-based authentication requires a departure from classical
zero-knowledge authentication systems. An effective system for the Web has to
compensate for almost complete exposure of authentication data while at the same
time being fast, portable, and low bandwidth. Classical zero-knowledge systems
alone do nothing to effectively solve the problem of phishing. Systems like SRP
which still use the memorable password as the only requisite information needed
for authentication are still subject to attack by deception. Including phishing
protection within a zero-knowledge system requires a change in the type of data
used in authentication.
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Two-Factor Authentication
One of the secure design principles set out in the seminal paper by Saltzer
& Schroeder [53] was the concept of "separation of privilege." Separation of
privilege stated that access should never be granted on the basis of a single
condition. This drove the development of the standard username/password
authentication system. On a physical terminal the username/password scheme
fulfills separation of privilege because both items must be known and entered
separately. With remote authentication the username/password model falls apart
due to the transmission medium; the username and password become a single
sequence of data which can be intercepted and replicated by malicious parties.
This compression of the username/password pair into a single authentication
condition through remote transmission is the reason why phishing is possible at all.
Remote authentication has been one of the primary motivations for the
development of stronger authentication systems. One of the stronger mechanisms
developed is referred to as two-factor authentication, and uses a combination of
authenticating credentials which have no implicit relationship to each other.
Two-factor authentication does not solely rely on the traditional
username/password scheme for identification, but uses an element of a completely
different nature which is immune to disclosure through psychological
manipulation. Under a two-factor system the disclosure of a password would be
insufficient to authenticate with the server and could not be used to derive the
second authentication factor.
Two-factor authentication schemes are resistant to psychological deceptions
(like phishing) because they use an authentication factor that is unknown to the
user, and so is not subject to disclosure. Username and password can be
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considered information a user "knows"; in a two-factor identification scheme, the
user must also provide something outside the scope of their "knowledge" to prove
their identity. This is usually achieved with something a user "has" (e.g., a
software token, a key card) or something the user "is", (e.g., biometrics).
While implementations of two-factor authentication commonly use a
password memorized by the user as one of the authentication factors, the other
factor varies significantly. The first two-factor systems used physical "smart cards"
which could be read by specialized hardware and produce one-time keys for
granting access [68]. One of the most popular forms of two-factor authentication in
use today is biometrics [69, 70, 71], although it has been hampered by the cost and
reliability of readers. Current systems focused on remote authentication over a
network often use asymmetric cryptography keys as a factor (like Kerberos [72])),
while others use software tokens with un-memorizable values [73].
Various two-factor authentication systems for use on the Web have been
proposed [74, 75] but have gained little traction. Only banks, the main targets of
phishing, have made investments into two-factor authentication systems which
operate over the Web. The lack of standards and a reliance on additional hardware
have limited the effectiveness of these solutions. Two-factor is also sometimes
erroneously seen as a magic bullet against attackers, which leads to
implementations that defend against phishing but do not counter traditional
threats to authentication [76].
Like zero-knowledge, two-factor authentication cannot prevent the user
from disclosing the information they have memorized (i.e., a password), but
two-factor does prevent the negative consequences of password disclosure:
unauthorized access. In ZeKo, two-factor authentication protects against the
consequences of a potentially successful phishing attack while providing all the
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advantages of a traditional strong authentication mechanism. Currently ZeKo uses
a large random value (a software token) to implement its second factor (the first
being a password), but this could be changed to use any other identifying
characteristic (such as biometrics) that is not user memorizable. While the token
is essential to authentication, it is never transmitted during the authentication
process and its value is unknown to the user. The token's very nature as an
unmemorable value makes it immune to disclosure through psychological
deception-such as phishing-and any sort of attack on the authentication process.
The ZeKo protocol involves two sequences of communications: the setup
phase and the authentication procedure itself.
Setup Procedure
The goal of the setup procedure is to initialize the authentication data at
both the client and server for future authentication (illustrated in Figure 2). In
particular, the client will acquire two independent authentication elements: a
password and a token. The server will obtain a verifier that can be used to
establish their own identity and check the client's responses. (Application-specific
user account details can also be negotiated during setup, however, this is outside
the scope of the protocol.) I assume that prior to setup, there has been some sort
of secure identification of the server that the client is performing setup with, and a
username has also been agreed upon (otherwise there is a threat of "setup
convolution", discussed in Sec. V ).
The setup procedure in ZeKo consists of the following steps:
1. The client and the server establish a secure communications channel, which
could be accomplished using Transport Layer Security [77] (TLS). This
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Fig. 2: ZeKo Setup procedure
I Server associatesp -J with usernamefor future authentication
secure channel protects against interception of the authentication data that
the client and the server will exchange in the following steps.
2. The server creates a token unique to the user by generating a large random
number. Immediately after the client receives the token, the server erases the
token from its memory, as it is no longer needed by the server. Because the
data on the server is assumed to be compromised, if the server were to retain
the token it could make the user vulnerable to phishing in the future. (It is
still an open question as to whether the client or server should generate the
token and how it should be redistributed to other authenticating devices,
addressed in more detail in Sec. V.)
3. After the client receives the token from the server, it chooses a password.
The password does not necessarily have to be complex or unique in order to
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be secure, but it should be non-trivial. With the token and the password as
the input, the client then uses a strong one-way hash function to calculate a
hash value, and uses the hash value as a seed for creating a pair of
asymmetric keys, P and p-l. Anything encrypted by P can only be
decrypted by P-l, and vice-versa. P will be used by the client for encryption
during authentication, and p-1 is transmitted to the server through the
secure channel. The user can choose to keep both keys on the system for
faster future authentication, but for greater security can choose to keep only
the token on the system and recreate the keys with the password as needed
for authentication. The server receives p-l as well as the username, and
stores the tuple for future authentication.
The setup procedure's security is a result of being conducted through a
secure channel. In fact, even in the case of a full disclosure of the contents of the
communication, the interceptor does not have enough information to mimic the
user. Nonetheless, the full disclosure is not a desirable situation as it can make the
client vulnerable to phishing by the same attacker.
The steps for renegotiating the client and server authentication data (like in
a lost password/token situation) does not necessarily use this same process. There
are several mechanisms for handling the redistribution of the token, such as a
specialized procedure using other types of identifiable information but they are
beyond the scope of ZeKo's setup procedure. Exploration into the question of how
to handle renegotiation of authentication data and distribution of the token to
other devices has shown a simple repetition of the setup process to be insufficient,
discussed more thoroughly in Sec. V.
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The ZeKo Authentication Procedure
The following section outlines the actual process of authentication using
ZeKo. For clarity, the authentication process is divided into two phases: (1)
authentication of the server to the client (illustrated in Figure 3), and (2) the
authentication of the client to the server (illustrated in Figure 4).
In ZeKo the authentication of the server is a necessary condition of the
process. Other systems, such as SRP [67], can also provide server authentication,
but it is done after client authentication. While continuing to authenticate with a
server that has not authenticated itself does not put the client at greater risk, the
server's failure to authenticate itself in phase 1 makes phase 2 unnecessary.
All traffic transmitted during the authentication mechanism requires no
additional encryption at the transport layer and can be accomplished with UDP
messaging. UDP is actually the preferred manner of authentication as it requires
less commitment from the user (and server) to an authentication that may fail; this
is especially important on mobile devices where every transmission costs battery
time. At the end of authentication the conversation can be switched to a different
port over TCP at the same time as the transition to the shared symmetric key.
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Fig. 3: ZeKo Phase 1: Authenticating the server to the client.
Just prior to the initiation of authentication, the client recreates P and p- 1
using the password and token in the same manner as they were originally created
in the Setup procedure. While the client could keep a cached copy of P and p- 1
for later use, in the event the client is compromised the account would be
compromised. If only the token is kept on the client it would be impossible to
compromise the account by simply stealing the user's stored data since the
password is still unknown.
Phase 1 (authenticating the server to the client) consists of two steps:
1. The client creates a large random number unique to this session, rl (often
called a nonce), and encrypts it along with its IP address using P (the
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asymmetric key generated from the password and token). To make each
authentication session unique, rl could be composed of a random number
and a timestamp. The client then sends the encrypted information (i.e.,
P(IP, rd) along with its username to the server. The IP address is included
in order to prevent relay and man-in-the-middle attacks. While a
man-in-the-middle may be able to reuse an old authentication message or act
as a pass-through for a legitimate user, the IP address in the packet will not
match up.
The server receives the message and decrypts it using p-l discovering rl and
the IP address. The server checks the IP address to do a preliminary
confirmation of the client; an incorrect address being evidence of a relay
attack (accommodations are made for users operating behind a NAT).
2. The server then uses a strong one-way hash function on rl and its own
decryption key, p-l. It generates its own unique random number r2, and
transmits it to the client along with the hash it just generated, i.e., hash(rl,
P-l). The client receives the hash and r2, and checks against a hash of rl
and p-l it generates itself. An identical hash proves to the client that the
server it is communicating with has p-l and was able to successfully decrypt
rl. From this the client can conclude that the server is authentic.
Authenticating Client to Server
Phase 2 (authenticating the client to the server) builds on the first phase,
and consists of the two steps below:
1. After confirming the server's validity in phase 1, the client hashes together
the random numbers generated by both the client and server (rl and r2), and
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Fig. 4: ZeKo Phase 2: Authenticating the client to the server.
encrypts them with P. It then sends the encrypted hash, i.e., P(hash(rl' r2),
), to the server.
2. The server decrypts and checks the hash from the client with a hash
generated by the server consisting of the same elements. If the hash sent is
identical to one generated by the server, the client must be the entity who
successfully encrypted rl, and therefore knows P (which was created using
the password and token).
In the interest of speed, after the completion of the authentication the
server and client will want to use a symmetric key for the remainder of their
conversation. This can be done on the basis of elements both the client and server
would know and which could not be observed during the authentication process,
such as: hash(p-l(rl, )). This is however a sub-optimal solution; in the case that
31
the server data has been compromised it would be possible for a middleman to
eavesdrop on the conversation after the transition to a symmetric key. The more
secure response would be for the server to send the first packet of data sent to the
client encrypted with p-l containing a generated symmetric key for subsequent
use.
System Properties
Resiliency against the Theft of Authentication Data
In an adversarial environment like the Internet, any site that a user
attempts to access could possibly be a phisher. In order to safely authenticate in
this environment, a secure authentication system must allow both parties to
definitively prove their identity to each other without disclosing any sensitive
information. ZeKo achieves this through the use of zero-knowledge authentication
Although zero-knowledge authentication prevents the theft of the user's
secrets during authentication, we still have to assume that users will disclose some
of their login information through some other channel, like a deceptive webpage.
In order to combat the release of user authentication data, ZeKo merges
zero-knowledge authentication with two-factor authentication.
ZeKo's use of tokens in collaboration with the password not only protects
against the use of trivial passwords, but more importantly, invalidates
psychological attacks such as phishing.
Resiliency against Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
The assumption of an adversarial network requires the system to be
resilient against all forms of man-in-the-middle attack: interception, relay and
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replay. Zero-knowledge authentication provides part of a solution to
man-in-the-middle attacks: it protects against the disclosure of sensitive
information through interception. However, attacks through direct manipulation of
an authentication session (such as relay and replay) are a problem that has to be
defeated through careful system design.
ZeKo uses session uniqueness and message source confirmation to stop
replay and relay attacks, respectively. Varying certain elements of the
authentication process in each session, ZeKo denies the attacker the information
needed to impersonate the user by replaying old authentication sessions with the
server. The system can also prevent a man-in-the-middle attacker from gaining
access by relaying packets from the user by inserting elements into the
authentication process (i.e., the IP address in the first message) that confirm the
source of the messages.
Resiliency against Cryptanalysis
The goal of any cryptographic attack is to learn enough of a user's
authentication data that the attacker can mimic the legitimate user. In any
authentication scheme, cryptanalysis could be conducted on the user
authentication data, server authentication data, and the authentication traffic.
ZeKo is resilient against cryptanalysis by protecting these vulnerable data sets, as
well as their combinations:
• User authentication data: ZeKo derives its strength from the
independence of authentication elements under two-factor authentication: if
an attacker steals one element of the user's authentication data, it is
impossible to cryptanalyze it to derive the other element. In particular,
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although phishing may yield the username/password pair to a phisher, the
phisher cannot use the password to discover the user's other authentication
element and login to a user's account. In short, as long as an attacker does
not hold the entire set of a user's authentication data, they cannot then use
cryptanalysis to learn how to impersonate the user. (Note that complete
knowledge of a user's authentication data would result in a compromised
account regardless of the authentication scheme.)
• Server authentication data: Just as a user needs a set of authentication
data to prove its identity, a server needs its own set of data to confirm the
user's identity. For our purposes, the disclosure of secret server data is
assumed to be frequent and pervasive with the server always potentially
compromised. In this design, stealing the server's authentication data will
not make it easier for an attacker to impersonate a valid user and
authenticate with the server. The attacker may use the server authentication
data in an attempt to impersonate the server and trick a user into
authenticating with them, but that would not provide the attacker with any
data that does not still require the solution of a difficult cryptographic
problem.
• Authentication traffic: When a user authenticates themselves to a server
(i.e., a website), the data that the user exchanges with the server provides
the richest pool of data for cryptanalysis. The assumption that the network
is adversarial means an attacker could have full access to all authentication
traffic. Fortunately, zero-knowledge authentication systems, including ZeKo,
are specifically designed to conceal secrets, thus are resistant to cryptanalysis
on intercepted data [60, 62, 64, 65]. Using state-of-the-art hash functions and
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cryptographic techniques [78, 79] ZeKo protects all the authentication data
that is used in composing messages between a client and a server. ZeKo also
ensures that data specific to an authentication session cannot be discovered
by attackers through cryptanalysis, preventing the use of replay and selective
dictionary attacks.
Resistance to cryptanalysis is acheaved through defense-in-depth. Using
just the traffic intercepted during a successful authentication session, an attacker
will not be able to derive even the data specific to an authentication session, let
alone the authentication data. Even if an attacker can learn some session-specific
data, it will be insufficient for the attacker to discover any user or server
authentication data. If an attacker discovers the server's authentication data, they
will still not be able to obtain the user's authentication data. In the case that an
attacker stole one element of the user's authentication data, it will not help the
attacker to reveal the other.
While the client and the server successfully authenticate each other through
the zero-knowledge authentication process, neither of them disclosed any
information to the other-or anyone listening in on the communication-that
would compromise the integrity of their private data.
Anti-Phishing Features
Of the properties of ZeKo discussed previously, there are several specific
features which make it well suited to combatting phishing:
• Even if a phisher discovers the client's username and password, they cannot
login as the client. The client's username and password are insufficient to
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derive P or the token, and the token cannot be exposed through phishing
since its value is unknown to the user. Because our system is two-factored,
the token is entirely unrelated in nature to the password. Possessing either
the password or the token tells you nothing about the other. With the
client's password but without the client's asymmetric key P, the phisher
cannot even perform phase 1 of authentication, where P must be used to
encrypt rl in order to create a message to the server. The asymmetric key P
is also needed in phase 2 to send the client's response to the server.
• Even if a phisher steals all the authentication data from the server, the
phisher cannot login as the client to the legitimate server. Having the server's
authentication data, i.e., p- 1 , will not help an attacker learn the client's
authentication data (i.e., P, the token, or the client's password). Recall that
zero-knowledge authentication (Sec. III) does not require the client to expose
its secret, so the fake server will not learn the token or P by pretending to be
the server and authenticating the client.
• The attacker cannot use cryptanalysis to learn the client's authentication
data, even with all the authentication traffic. Except the random number r2
from the server, all ZeKo authentication traffic consists of either strong
one-way hash values or messages encrypted with the asymmetric key P. As
the strength of the state-of-the-art asymmetric encryption and strong
one-way hash functions are well established and still advancing, it is
effectively impossible to crypto-analyze the traffic and derive the hash input
or asymmetric keys used. Therefore, since the phisher must have both the
password and the token to calculate P or have P itself to impersonate the
36
client, the phisher will not be able to login as the client to the legitimate
server.
• Man-in-the-middle attacks are ineffective. Without knowledge of the server's
authentication data, i.e., P-l, the attacker cannot pretend to be the server
and authenticate itself to the client. Even with the knowledge of the server's
authentication data, as was illustrated above, the attacker will not be able to
impersonate the client to login to the legitimate server. The phase 2 message
from the client to the server is a hash encrypted with the client's P, and an
attacker cannot forge such a message unless they knows both P and rl.
As the random number rl is unique in each authentication session, it
prevents an attacker from locating and replaying an old message from the
server in phase 1 (i.e., "hash(rl, P- I ), r2") in an attempt to impersonate the
server. Furthermore, in authenticating the client to the server in phase 2, the
message P(hash(rl' r2)) also includes a random number r2 that is unique to
the authentication session. This ensures an attacker cannot replay old
messages from the client to the server to impersonate the client. With the
current setup, the attacker can replay an old message from the client to the
server in phase 1 (i.e., P(IPaddress, rl)); however, the random number r2
that the server returns in phase 1 is unique to every session, and the attacker
will not be able to locate and replay an old message from the client to the
server in phase 2 that used the current r2' thus the attacker will not be able
to replay messages from phase 2 (since they will receive a new unique r2 from
the server).
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Cryptanalysis based on authentication traffic is also difficult for an attacker.
Even when an attacker eavesdrops the entire conversation of every
authentication process, they cannot discover anything about the password,
the token, P, P-l, or ri. As said above, except the random number r2 in the
clear, all authentication traffic is protected with either strong one-way hash
functions or asymmetric encryption.
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CHAPTER IV
EVALUATION
In this section I compare the performance of ZeKo to other authentication
mechanisms with similar properties. The evaluation measures the quantifiable
properties of each system as well as an in-depth security analysis of the benefits
and drawbacks of each system when compared against ZeKo.
Methodology
Evaluated Systems
Given the diversity of authentication systems available for evaluation, it
was necessary to select systems for comparison with the most similar security
properties to ZeKo. Because the proposed system is a combination of both
two-factor and zero-knowledge authentication it is reasonable to select a
representative from each of those groups, along with a username/password system
to act as a baseline; each system provides some of the features of ZeKo through
the use of a different authentication mechanism. Using a side-by-side comparison
with other zero-knowledge and two-factor authentication systems, I analyze ZeKo's
contribution to anti-phishing work.
The zero-knowledge representative is SRP [67], the most current and widely
used descendant of the EKE lineage discussed in Section III. SRP provides mutual
------------- -
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authentication and leak-free key negotiation to its users while also being resilient
against the loss of certain parts of its authentication data. The two-factor
authentication representative is WikID [80], which is a publicly available, open
source product with a well-defined authentication procedure. Operating on top of
a secure connection, WikID uses a combination of password and unique
asymmetric key shared between the client and server. For a baseline system I also
use a simple username/password authentication system over TLS [77].
Examined Metrics
An effective web authentication mechanism requires not just robust security
but a specific set of performance attributes. Given that web access is being
included into a diverse range of platforms and devices, few assumptions can be
made as to the resources available to perform the authentication. The conservative
approach to the development of a new authentication system must therefore seek
to minimize the load it puts on both the client device and the network being used.
All security conditions being equal, the authentication solution which consumes
the least resources can be considered optimal.
The most important concern for devices which have limited connectivity to
the authentication server is the minimization of network usage. The network load
can be characterized independently of the underlying network conditions by
looking at the total amount of data sent and received during the authentication
process as well as the number of round trips (RT) the authentication mechanism
makes to complete the process. Used in conjunction with the analysis of
computational load, network load can provide a realistic estimate of the total time
required for authentication given differing network conditions.
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To measure the load on the device computationally I used the execution
time required for (1) the client to contact and complete the authentication
procedure, (2) the time needed by the server to process the request from the client
and grant or deny access, and (3) the total time needed to complete the transaction
- from the initiation by the client to the final step in the authentication process.
All the timing experiments were conducted over the test-bed machine's internal
loopback address with both the server and client running on the same machine,
minimizing any effect of network conditions on latency.
The other load conditions that act upon a device during authentication are
the memory costs of performing the authentication steps as well as the storage cost
required to keep the data needed to perform the authentication. While memory
calculations fluctuate through the life of the program, the average memory used is
sampled throughout the life of the execution cycle and the maximal amount of
memory used give a good estimate of the peak and average cost. Memory analysis
is restricted to the client program, which is assumed to have greater restrictions on
resources then the server. Storage cost is a calculation of everything needed by the
authentication mechanism that cannot be actively remembered by the user (i.e.,
username and password), such as asymmetric keys and identifying tokens.
Security Comparisons
When compared to the baseline system, username/password over TLS,
ZeKo provides a significantly greater level of security against phishing and
deception attacks. The use of TLS protects the submission of the
username/password against active eavesdroppers, but does not inherently identify
the receiving server. The certificate systems in PKI which is supposed to fulfill the
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role of positively identifying the server are completely separate from the
authentication process, with TLS only protecting against man-in-the-middle
attacks. The failure of this system to stop phishing is discussed in greater detail in
Section II
Representing a two factored approach, WiKID attempts to combat phishing
through the use of asymmetric keys. The WikID system is designed as a separate
authentication server which issues access tickets to other servers in the form of
passcodes, shared secret byte streams. The WiKID authentication server uses the
combination of a Device ID and a PIN submitted by the user to establish the
user's identity, this process is protected by the server's asymmetric key and
immune from phishing. Once the server has confirmed the Device ID and PIN to
be valid it responds to the user with a time-sensitive passcode which will be
recognized by the server the user actually wants to access. The fundamental flaw
in this system is that the usage of the passcode is not standardized; if this
passcode is used in a similar fashion to a username/password system then the
system is no more secure against phishing then username/password over TLS.
While there is a guarantee about the authenticity of the WiKID authentication
server, there is no guarantee about the authenticity of the server on which the
passcode will be used, or how it will be used. Because of this lack of identification
of the server receiving the passcode and how it is used, WiKID cannot be
considered completely immune to phishing.
The most similar system to ZeKo in mechanism is SRP. SRP is a
zero-knowledge protocol based which performs a symmetric key negotiation with
the user in a similar manner to the Diffie-Hellman [57] system, but is dependent
upon a pre-existing relationship between the two parties. In SRP, a client requests
a stored salt (a large nonce) from the server which it combines with a secret
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password to generate a shared value with the server. Through the exchange of
specially formulated messages both the client and the server solve an equation
which provides mutual verification of authenticity and generates a shared
symmetric key. Like ZeKo, SRP is resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks and the
negative effects of server data disclosure, but is not two-factored and is vulnerable
to phishing. Since SRP authentication requires only the standard
username/password pair along with the salt provided by the server to authenticate,
the acquisition of the username/password through phishing would be sufficient to
access the account as the server distributes the salt to all that ask for it.
Among the surveyed systems ZeKo provides all the security benefits of the
other systems while providing greater protections against phishing then any of the
other systems. The performance of ZeKo aside, there are sufficient arguments for
the adoption of ZeKo solely on the security gains it provides.
A summary of the security properties of each system is presented in Table 1.
Man-in-the-middle Attacks Cryptographic Strength Phishing Protection
TLS High Medium Low
WikID High High Medium
SRP High High Low
ZeKo High High High
Tab. 1: Security Properties Summary
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Experimental Conditions
In order to examine only the authentication mechanism used by the
evaluated systems, each was implemented in Java based on the posted specification
without any additional functionality. The authentication procedures for SRP and
WiKID were described in detail in their respective documents [67, 80] and the
process of username/password authentication using one-way hashes is well known.
The establishment and maintenance of the secure connection for systems which
used TLS (WiKID and username/password) is handled by the java library for
secure connections: j avax.net.ssl. The initial setup procedures needed by the
systems to distribute authentication data for future authentication is handled by a
separate program and not included in this analysis.
The choice to implement the systems in Java was motivated in part by the
capabilities of Sun's Hotspot JVM [81] which provides real-time monitoring of
memory usage during execution. The calculation of memory usage is based on
samples of the Java heap size collected 10 ms apart throughout the life of client
program. For our purposes the maximal sample is considered to be the maximal
memory requirement. Timing is calculated using the system timer functionality
and measures the time in milliseconds from the retrieval of authentication data off
the hard disk to the receipt/transmittal of the final authentication message.
All of the systems evaluated used an asymmetric key in one form or another
and so the size of that key was standardized to be 1024 bits, an accepted standard
for key lengths. The RSA asymmetric key algorithm [58] (as implemented by Java)
was used for generation of the keys as well as encryption and decryption. All of
the systems also used one-way hashes during authentication and this procedure
was standardized to use the MD5 [82] (as implemented by Java).
44
Three of the systems (ZeKo, SRP and username/password) used passwords
and usernames as factors in the authentication, the size of both the passwords and
usernames was standardized to 40-bits to reflect the findings of a large-scale survey
of website passwords [83]. WiKID had several authentication elements which had
no direct parallel in the other systems, but which filled the roles of username and
passwords, these were also standardized to 40 bits. WikID was also alone in the
generation and use of a symmetric key during the authentication procedure, this
key was generated using the AES [84] standard with the commonly accepted size
of 128 bits. Both ZeKo and SRP used nonces during the authentication procedure,
these were both standardized to be 24 bytes.
All of the authentication programs analyzed were run on a Apple Power
Mac with dual 1.25 GHz G4 processors and 512 MB of RAM. The code was
developed and tested using Java and HotSpot JVM Ver. 1.5 on top of Apple's as
x 10.4.11. Whenever possible the network and memory usage of the programs was
minimized and shared mechanisms, such as encryption/decryption, were handled
by the same procedures.
Results
Results are summarized in Table 2. The presented results are the the
arithmetic mean (rounded to the nearest whole number) of 10 complete
authentication experiments of each system.
Tab. 2: ZeKo Evaluation Results
Networking (Bytes) Timing (ms) Memory (KBytes) Storage (Bytes)
C--+S S--+C Total Round Trip (RT) Client Server Total Max Avg Client Server
TLS 416 239 655 3 1444 234 1445 2397 2322 0 21
WikID 400 581 981 3.5 1573 304 1528 2398 2202 152 160
SRP 89 146 235 2 130 82 132 615 573 128 197
ZeKo 261 63 324 1.5 1538 757 1544 1444 957 128 133
...,.
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ZeKo scored consistently better then WiKID and username/password over
TLS in terms of network usage and memory costs. ZeKo also had a lower
associated storage cost then every system except username/password. SRP scored
better then ZeKo in most categories due to the fact that the implementation
performs the asymmetric encryption and decryption mathematically, and not
through the Java libraries. The results suggest that ZeKo provides superior
performance to all the surveyed systems except SRP, which does not provide the
same level of protection against phishing as ZeKo.
An in-depth analysis of the results are presented below:
Networking
SRP had the lowest overall networking usage for bytes sent and received,
though made slightly more Round Trips (RT) then ZeKo due to an extra message
needed to authenticate the server to the client (the last step in SRP). ZeKo's
higher byte count when compared to SRP mostly due to the increased use of
encryption in ZeKo's first and third messages. For cryptographic reasons, the size
of the encrypted data is always a multiple of the size of the key. When the data to
be encrypted is not an exact multiple of the key size, the data is "padded" to
reach the size of the next multiple. This padding present in the usage of encrypted
data added to the size of the transmitted messages in ZeKo that was not present
in SRP.
ZeKo scored better then WiKID and the username/password system
primarily because of the overhead required for the initiation of the TLS connection
both used. The setup and tear-down cost of TLS on both systems was 644 Bytes
and 2.5 RTs. This secure connection cost was larger then the cost of the
47
authentication procedure itself of the systems that used it; authentication alone
cost 11 Bytes + 0.5 RT for username/password and 337 Bytes + 1 RT for WiKID.
Because WiKID also used encryption for its messages it also experienced some
padding of the data transmitted.
The username/password scheme transmitted a total of 11 Bytes for its
authentication which is greater then the expected 10 Bytes (40 bit username, 40
bit password); the extra byte acts as the length field that would be needed to
separate the username and password if their lengths were not known prior to
authentication.
Timing
ZeKo's worst performance was in the amount of time needed to complete
the authentication. Much of this is due to increased amount of encryption and
decryption that ZeKo performs using asymmetric keys when compared to the
other systems. In total ZeKo performs 2 encryptions, 2 decryptions and 4 hashing
operations; only WiKID does a similar number of encryption/decryptions and
consequently is closest to ZeKo in terms of time needed to authenticate speed.
As expected SRP did the best due to the low-level implementation of its key
generation. The username/password system was the second fastest due to the fact
it only needed to perform a single hashing function to complete its authentication.
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Memory Usage
Again SRP outperformed all other systems due to the speed of its low-level
implementation, requiring only the storage and calculation of large numbers. ZeKo
used less average and peak memory then the other two systems primarily due to
the memory overhead associated with the TLS connection.
Both WiKID and username/ password show similar max memory sizes
which suggests that the establishment of the secure connection was the most
memory intensive procedure used by each of the programs. The higher average
usage of the username/password system is most likely due to the shorter execution
span of the program and the lack of delay in response from the server. The average
memory usage while WiKID is waiting for server authentication drops, skewing the
overall average lower then username/password which experiences no server delay.
Storage Costs
Predictably the storage cost for username/password was the least, as the
username and password are stored by the user and the server only needs to
maintain a hash of the password and a username. ZeKo required less storage then
the other systems, though came very close to SRP. SRP requires slightly more
space on the server to accommodate the "salt" which it distributes to users in the
first step of authentication. WiKID also used less space on the server then SRP
but required more space on the client because of the use of several long ID tags
related to the server and device being authenticated.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
To conclude this work I will explore the applications for ZeKo
authentication outside of the Web as well as associated areas of research related to
this topic. Finally, I will provide a review of ZeKo's contributions.
ZeKo Applications
ZeKo lends itself not only to combating phishing on the Web, but also to
any application that needs strong, leak-proof authentication over an open
transmission medium (such as the Internet or a wireless network). The protocol
can modify the size of its keys and nonces to maximize security, performance, or
bandwidth conservation (depending on the context). For example, a lightweight
version of ZeKo could be used on mobile devices, or larger keys could be used in
enterprise networks to provide more protection against data disclosure.
Mobile devices hold some of the greatest promise for ZeKo. Many mobile
devices desire to take advantage of open wireless hotspots to conduct texting and
voice communication that does not utilize cell service. The cost in battery power
of wireless transmissions and the security concerns of connecting to untrusted
networks are two main restrictions to implementing this technology. Because ZeKo
uses rather small UDP packets for the initial server authentication it requires a
----- ------- -- -------
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minimal investment in battery power by the mobile device to test the network's
connectivity. The system also assumes the mobile device is connecting to a hostile
network, so there is no security risk in attempting to initiate authentication over
the network.
Associated Areas of Research
During the investigation of ZeKo I encountered several key issues which
mirror larger questions related to phishing and authentication. These issues
provide a roadmap for exploring other elements of network security that have a
direct impact on anti-phishing authentication.
Authentication Setup
One of the dangers surrounding the implementation of an authentication
system involves setup convolution. Setup convolution is a situation where an
attacker manipulates the initial exchange of authentication data during account
setup in such a way that both the user and attacker have access to the account on
the legitimate server, leaving the user with no clue that the account has been
compromised. The most obvious way of performing setup convolution is to lure a
potential user to an attacker's site using an e-mail that encourages joining, or
through DNS manipulation. Once at the attackers site, the user undergoes a setup
process identical to the one that they would encounter at the legitimate site. All
responses given by the user during setup could be relayed to the legitimate site
where an identical setup is taking place. There are several solutions to prevent
setup convolution as described above, but setup convolution is only a sample of a
more significant problem.
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An exploration of setup convolution brings up fundamental questions about
account setup in an untrustworthy environment. The most conventional answer to
this problem is to use certificates authorized by some trusted third party to verify
a site's authenticity; but this solution only works if comprehensively implemented
and enforced. Browsers allow users the option of accepting untrusted certificates
or sending data to a website over unencrypted channels, a functionality which is
needed for some legitimate purposes but which still poses a threat to the account.
The question becomes: how to ask users for information in a way that cannot be
exploited? Is there a way of asking for information which also confirms the asker?
What are the general requirements for sending data in such a way that only an
intended party has access when there is no obvious way to identify the intended
party? These question all fall in line with the investigation about how to conduct
authentication without trust.
The Out-oj-System Mechanism (OSM)
Apart from the problem of initially distributing the authentication data is
the problem of redistribution. While the elements used in authentication can be
distributed to the client securely during startup, we also have to consider
situations in which they need to be redistributed. A user may forget passwords or
lose authentication tokens, leaving them unable to authenticate with the server.
The authentication elements need a simple, yet secure, mechanism through which
they can be redistributed. Redistribution of authentication elements after setup
would have to be performed outside of the authentication system itself since a
secure mechanism could not be performed without those elements. This question
of how to distribute authentication data after setup is actually a question of how
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to restore a legitimate user access to their account without authentication. I have
termed the method of distributing authentication data outside of the setup
procedure as the out-oj-system mechanism, or OSM.
The simplest OSM for our system seems to be to distribute the token via
e-mail in parallel to the setup procedure. The prevalence of web-accessible e-mail
makes for a highly accessible way to distribute to other systems. Clearly, this OSM
raises problems because it is susceptible to interception, and access to the e-mail
account may too be susceptible to phishing. Another solution may be a specialized
token re-negotiation process based on an independent confirmation of identity.
Naturally, the re-negotiation would have to be as secure and resistant to phishing
as the rest of the system.
OSM appears at first glance to be just an implementation issue, but it is
actually part of a broader discussion about the nature of secure relationships. The
question about how best to redistribute the elements of ZeKo is actually a
question about how the attributes of the authentication elements affect the nature
of secure relationships. An investigation of the interplay of authentication element
attributes and their effect on the security of the system provides insight into what
essential requirements are needed for a secure relationship.
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Current systems have to rely on home-grown analysis tools to argue for
their security and cannot examine the entirety of the threats. If there were a
rigorous definition of the elements and attributes necessary for a secure
relationship, then protocols could be proven secure in a formal way before even
being implemented. Exploration of the OSM problem combined with a systematic
security analysis of the protocol could provide a good basis for exploring the
fundamental nature of secure systems.
ZeKo's Contributions
ZeKo provides an advancement over traditional zero-knowledge systems
such as SRP and EKE through the use of a mutual authentication scheme that
requires less round trips and total messages transmitted. ZeKo also contributes to
two-factor authentication through the integration of the second factor into the
messaging process; while most two factor schemes use the second factor as an
additional password, ZeKo uses only the combination of the elements together for
authentication making them harder to intercept or disclose.
While ZeKo shares some common elements and procedures with other
authentication systems, the operation of ZeKo is is distinctly unique from other
mechanisms. The use of the password and token to create a shared asymmetric
key is similar to a mechanism for creating an asymmetric key used in SRP, but the
usage of that key to guarantee phish-proof mutual authentication in three
messages is a technique found only in ZeKo.
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Overall, ZeKo provides significant improvement over the
username/password system used in web authentication today and has
anti-phishing advantages not provided by other strong authentication systems. In
addition to the unique security benefits, ZeKo also requires less overhead then
comparable systems. The combination of two-factor and zero-knowledge
authentication provided here is a significant step forward in addressing the root
causes of phishing.
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